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SURVEY OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
IN WASHINGTON
JOHN RICHARD STEINCIPHER*
In 1870, Dr. Samuel Gross topically stated that malpractice suits
have, unfortunately, been exceedingly common in this country during
the last twenty-five years, and.., no physician or surgeon, however
exalted his character or position is exempt from them.'
Today, the number of these claims nears 9,000 a year 2 at a cost
of over 45 million dollars,8 such that one out of every seven physicians
in the United States has been sued for professional negligence., This
alarming increase in claims, the majority of which are deemed by many
to be "without merit,"5 represents one of the most interesting and par-
adoxical legal developments in recent years, since attorneys specializing
in these matters estimate that they reject 80 per cent of the claims
brought to them, and even with this, the defending physicians are
victorious in 70 per cent of the cases.6
While the speculation as to the increase in these claims" ranges from
the atmosphere of medical infallibility precipitated by the phenomenal
progress made by medicine each decade, to the passing of the physician-
patient relationship of the old-fashioned physician,8 it is beyond con-
* Instructor, University of Washington School of Law. Copyright @ 1964 by John
R. Steincipher. All Rights Reserved.
1 Quoted by Wesson, Medical Malpractice Suits: A Physician's Primer For De-
fendants, 8 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 254 (1959).
2 Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Saturday Evening Post, April 11, 1959,
pp. 13, 14.
33 AVERBACII, HANDLING ACCIDENT CASES 3:1 (1960); citing Silverman, supra
note 2.
4 Committee on Medicolegal Problems, Professional Liability and the Physician, 183
A.M.A.J. 695 (1963).
5 See: Kennelly, Negligence Law: Medical Malpractice Claims-Some Observa-
tions For The Defense, 6 TRIAL LAW. GUIDE 426 (1962) ; 3 AvERBACH, op. cit. supra
note 3, at 3:7; Borgelt, An Analysis of Medical Malpractice, 24 INS. COUNSEL J. 267,
268 (1957).
6 CUSUMANO, MALPRACTICE LAw DISSECTED FOR QUICK GRASPING 23 (1962). It
might, however, be wise to heed the sage advice of Disraeli that there are three kinds
of lies-"lies, damn lies, and statistics."
7 In, Committee on Medicolegal Problems, supra note 4, at 696, six reasons are given
for the increase in such claims including (1) the change in the public attitude due to
publicity about the marvels of medical science without regard to the serious and un-
expected complications that sometimes result, (2) the increase in the amounts of the
juries' awards in malpractice claims, (3) inflation, (4) the extension of doctrines by
the courts which tend to favor plaintiffs, i.e., res ipsa loquitur, (5) increasing compe-
tence of plaintiff's attorneys by increased knowledge of medicolegal matters, and (6)
the increased hazards of medicine and surgery.
8 See, Borgelt, supra note 5, at 268.
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jecture to say that each patient must be reckoned a potential mal-
practice claimant. Indeed, "a potential law suit is one of the 'rights'
that a patient has each time he visits the doctor" 9-- a fact to which
18,500 living members of the American Medical Association can
testify10
Following the premise that a well-informed, satisfied patient seldom
sues,11 physicians have increasingly sought to keep the patient fully
informed, and to carefully document each case; in this, reaction to
malpractice claims has benefited both parties. However, there is no
doubt but that this increase has impeded the progress of medicine,"2
penalized those who have meritorious claims, and precipitated devel-
opments in both law and medicine founded upon reaction, rather than
logic.
Thus, though physicians have tended to avoid procedures which,
although exceedingly valuable, carry great risk with respect to certain
individuals (aortography, spinal anesthesia), the fear of suit has
engendered resort to protective measures (numerous laboratory tests
and other diagnostic aids) manifestly increasing the cost of illness.
The increase in claims has also undoubtedly drawn the medical profes-
sion together, giving credence to the charged existence of a "conspiracy
of silence."1 3 This fact, coupled with the physician's reluctance to
participate in legal proceedings,14 invariably penalizes the plaintiff with
a meritorious claim, insofar as, in the ordinary malpractice action,
"Malpractice: Current Articles and Cases, 3 Current Med. 32 (1956).10 Wesson, supra note 1.
"1 Doctor & Law, March 1961, p. 1; Belli, Medical Malpractice, 3 N.H.B.J. 60
(1961).1 2 SrTTLE & Moarrz, DOCTOR ANDh PATIENT AND THE LAW 442 (4th ed. 1962).
1s Belli, An Ancient 77terapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1 ViL..
L. REv. 250 (1956). Writings in Huffman v. Lindquist, 37 Cal. App. 2d. 465, 234 P.2d
34, 46 (1951), Judge-Carter of the California bench stated that "Anyone familiar with
cases of this character knows that the so-called ethical practitioner will not testify on
behalf of a plaintiff regardless of the merits of his case.... But... physicians who are
members of medical societies flock to the defense of their fellow member charged with
malpractice and the plaintiff is relegated, for his expert testimony, to the occasional
lone wolf or heroic soul, who for the sake of truth and justice has the courage to run
the risk of ostracism by his fellow practitioners and the cancellation of his public lia-
bility insurance policy."
Such observations are an interesting contrast to opinions that "every malpractice
suit, without any exception, is instigated either directly or indirectly by a doctor."
Wesson, stpra note 1, at 254.
14" It is well known that many doctors have a fear of the courtroom, based in part
upon the prospect of a cross examination which frequently takes the form of a direct
challenge to the doctor's ability and credibility. The average doctor is not prepared, by
training or temperament, for such assaults and frequently his courtroom experience
results in bitterness and distrust for the legal profession and the system which permits
such practices." Holschuh, Advocacy in the Preparation and Presentation of Medical
Evidence, 27 INs. COUNsEr J. 482, 485 (1960). But despite these fears, a past president
of the American Medical Association, Dr. Allman, has noted the physician's obligation
1964]
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another doctor must testify to the defendant physician's negligence."
This injustice is as pitiable as the sordid entrance of malpractice
claims in an attempt to "blackmail" the physician; the solution to both
lies simply in the determined opposition to unjustified claims, and the
fulfillment of the "moral obligation to settle and grant damages to a
patient.., injured through negligence or breach of duty."' 6
Of all the reactions to the increase in malpractice claims, the most
bizarre has been the passage in twenty-eight states (and the failure in
eleven) 7 of Good Samaritan" laws. This quixotic legislation was
given birth in 1959 when California enacted a law providing that no
licensed physician,
who in good faith renders emergency care at the scene of the emergency,
shall be liable for any civil damages as a result of any act or omissions by
such person in rendering the emergency care.19
While the obvious purpose of this statute is to encourage the giving of
emergency aid by securing freedom from liability,20 diligent search has
disclosed no trial court or appellate cases concerning an action within
the purview of such legislation.2' Not only are these laws without
"to himself, to his profession, and to the public to cooperate with the legal profession
and the judiciary in providing sound, impartial medical testimony...." Impartial Medi-
cal Testimony, 27 INs. COUNSEL J. 184, 185 (1960).
15 See Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wn.2d 14, 163 P.2d 148 (1945), and discussion infra.
Growing disenchantment with this requirement is indicated in Comment, Putting Doc-
tors Back in the Boat with other Tort Defendants, 8 ALA. L. REv. 325 (1956).
16 Committee on Medicolegal Problems, supra note 4, at 702.
17 States which have enacted such laws are: Alaska, Arkansas, California, Con-
necticut, Georgia, Indiana, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi,
Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North
Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vir-
ginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming. Similar bills failed to pass in 1963 in Alabama, Colo-
rado, Florida, Idaho, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Oregon, Rhode Island,
Washington and West Virginia. Averbach, Good Samaritan Laws, 69 Case & Com.
13 (1964).
In 1963 no less than three such proposals were introduced in the Washington House
of Representatives [H.B. 103, 453, 519, 38 sess. § 1 (Feb. 22, 1963) ] only to die in
committee.
18 This legislation has been so named from the statement in the Gospel of St. Luke,
Chapter 10, verse 33, that "A certain Samaritan... had compassion on him...."1 9 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 2144 (Supp. 1961).
20 Only the Texas statute gives any statement of the statutory purpose. Tex. Laws
c. 317, p. 681 (1961). See Note, 40 TEXAS L. REV. 909, 910 (1962).
21 Doctor & Law, Nov. 1963, p. 3, "The interesting thing about the enactment of
these laws is that they result from fright rather than from any documented legal
decisions. The Law Department of the American Medical Association reports that it
has been completely unable to find references to any court decision in which a
physician has been found guilty of negligence after stopping to aid a person injured
in an automobile accident. Realizing that many insurance claims are made that never
result in lawsuits, the Law Department went further and contacted most of the major
malpractice insurance companies. Again, there was an absence of any basis for fear
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foundation, they are striking testimony of the extent to which the
liability of physicians has been exaggerated. In the absence of an
antecedent legal relation between the parties,22 the law has never rec-
ognized an affirmative duty to aid one in distress," and where such aid
is given, the standard of care and skill exacted would reflect the cir-
cumstances involved.2" Yet in place of these protective rules, legislation
would now substitute the initial determination as to whether the defend-
ant acted in "good faith,"" and whether it was an "emergency.""
on the part of physicians that they will be badly treated if they do what their
consciences tell them should be done." See also Averbach, supra note 17, at 16.
Preliminary reports of a recent AMA medical professional liability survey indicate
that "only a few of the reported claims involve the typical 'Good Samaritan' situation.
In only two was any compensation paid." AMA News, Oct. 26, 1964, p. 14, col. 2.
22 See generally PRossmE, TORTS § 36 (2nd ed. 1955). RCW 46.52.020(3) requres
the operator of any vehicle involved in an accident to "render to any person injured in
such accident reasonable assistance, including the carrying or the making of arrange-
ments for the carrying of such person to a physician or hospital for medical treatment
if it is apparent that such treatment is necessary or if such carrying is requested by the
injured person or on his behalf. Under no circumstances shall the rendering of assist-
ance ... be evidence of the liability of any operator for such accident." The imposition
of this duty, and a breach thereof, would support an action for negligence.
Other special relationships have been held to impose a duty to aid. Thus, a master
must render aid to a helpless servant, Szabo v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 132 N.J.L. 331, 40
A.2d 562 (1945) ; and a common carrier must refrain from aggravating the illness of a
passenger, Middleton v. Whitridge, 213 N.Y. 499, 108 N.E. 192 (1915).
23 2 HARPER &JAmSEs, TORTS § 18.6, at 1046 (1956) ; Annot, 64 A.L.PR2d 1179 (1959).
Eminent jurists have long deprecated this rule. Cardozo has stated: "For years there
has been a dogma on the books that in the absence of a special duty of protection, one
may stand by with indifference and see another perish, by drowning, say, or fire,
though there would be no peril in a rescue. A rule so divorced from morals was sure
to breed misgivings. We need not be surprised to find that in cases of recent date, a
tendency is manifest to narrow it or even whittle it away. We cannot say today that
the old rule has been supplanted" CARnozo, TiE PARADOxEs OF LEaAL SCIENCE, 25
(1928).
Yet the opponents of extending liability for nonfeasance proceed, not from moral
callousness, but from a valid fear that "clear guides for designating fault could not be
set up to prevent indiscriminate imposition of liability' Comment, 8 ALA. L. REv. 332,
333 (1956).24 In Doctor & Law, March 1961, p. 2, it is pointed out that while a physician is
under no legal duty to render treatment in an emergency, "once he does volunteer his
services, he is, of course, obligated to render such care as the circumstances and occa-
sion demand, within the usual and customary practice among physicians in the same or
similar localities. The standard of care expected of the physician in his office or the
hospital would not be expected at the scene of an accident." See also, discussion infra.
25 "Some perplexities are occasioned by use of the term 'in good faith. One wonders
if the line will be drawn at gross negligence-wantonness-wilfulness-or if still an-
other standard will be deirised." Note, 41 Nan. L. REv. 609, 615 (1962).
Only two of the bills introduced in the last Washington legislative session [H.B. 453,
and 519, 38 sess. § 1 (Feb. 22, 1963)] require "good faith." H.B. 519 is also the only
one of the three which refers to fees, requiring that "no fee is asked, charged, or con-
templated."26 In STmaLE & MoRiTz, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAw 335 (4th ed. 1962),
the authors note that "The failure of some of the statutes to define the word 'emer-
gency' causes further concern because emergencies, in the true sense of the word, can
occur in a hospital, in surgery, or in the doctor's office, and it is not felt that the courts
would be inclined to relieve physicians from liability for their negligent acts in such
situations.' See also: Note, 41 NEB. L. REv. 609, 614 (1962), and Note, 40 TEXAs L.
REv. 909, 911 (1962).
19641
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
Objection may also be raised that such legislation is void insofar as it
grants an unconstitutional special privilege and immunity." With
respect to the latter, the very presumption involved in physicians as a
group asking to be relieved of liability for their professional negligence,
has engendered unfavorable criticism. 8 There are cogent reasons for
the stringent rules of law protecting the professions-rules which no
more than reflect the obligation of society to protect such employments
from harsh and circumscribing requirements 9-but to treat physicians
with understanding is far different than shielding them from liability
regardless of their conduct. The latter position clearly is indefensible."
No matter how compelling the circumstances, a doctor "does not have
to volunteer his services in an emergency."'' Section 5 of the Principles
of Medical Ethics of the American Medical Association states: "A
physician may choose whom he will serve. In an emergency, however,
he should render service to the best of his ability.""2 Perhaps if this
were otherwise, if the public were informed that a physician is "ex-
pected to apply his knowledge freely and without fear of remote con-
sequences""3 there would be little threat or fear of such claims. At
least the image created would be more appealing than that of one asking
for relief from liability for negligence. In any case, the purpose of
these statutes is to encourage physicians to render treatment in an
emergency by overcoming the fear of malpractice claims-a fear which,
although totally imaginary, is unfortunately responsible for the reluc-
tance of physicians to assist in such cases. 4 Paradoxically, none of the
27 WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 12 provides: "No law shall be passed granting to any
citizen, class of citizens, or corporation other than municipal, privileges or immunities
which upon the same terms shall not equally belong to all citizens or corporations."
Perhaps because of the fear that such statutes applying to physicians alone amount to
unconstitutional class legislation (see STamER & MORTZ, op. cit. supra note 26) the
three bills introduced in the 1963 Washington legislature applied to "any person." Al-
though objection may be made to encouraging unqualified persons to attempt emergency
treatment, it is clearly unjust to impose responsibility for negligence upon them, while
granting immunity to physicians.
28 Doctor & Law, March 1961, p. 2, points out that the request for such special
protection may lead to misinterpretation of medicine's motives.
29 In Lince v. Monson, 363 Mich. 135, 108 N.W2d 845, 849 (1961), the court stated:
"Careless professional practice must not be made immune from redress at law. This is
imperative for the protection of the public. That same consideration, however, dictates
that no legal barriers be erected against a doctor's proceeding, in emergency or other-
wise ... without fear that his professional judgment and action shall be subjected to
the test of unlearned lay judgment ...."
30 See the veto message of Governor Kerner of Illinois to a "Good Samaritan" law
passed by both houses of the legislature, reported in Doctor & Law, supra note 21.
31 CUSUMANO, Op. cit. supra note 6, at 29.
32 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICICAL ETHICS, THE AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION 27
(1957) ; STETLER & MORITZ, op. cit. supra note 26, at 455.
33 AMA News, July 20, 1964, p. 13, col. 1.
34 In response to a question as to whether fear of malpractice would affect their
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Good Samaritan laws prevent the bringing of an action for malpractice;
at most, they give the physician a procedural advantage not enjoyed at
common law. 5 A patient's "right to sue" is affected only insofar as he
must allege gross negligence, willful or wanton misconduct, or that
"emergency care" was not in fact given. Since the present standard of
conduct actually requires no more than this, even under Good Samari-
tan legislation, expert testimony would be required to establish the
essential fact (unless within the exceptions to that rule)."
Thus, at most these statutes affect only the claimant's ultimate
recovery, not his right to sue; and the fear remains that even if a
physician wins a suit, he is "all but destroyed professionally.""7 Of
course, it is really this fear-of suit, as opposed to losing a suit-which
has brought about this legislation. Yet these statutes do not, and can-
not, afford protection from the stigma and inconvenience accompanying
a malpractice action.3 But this too has been magnified out of all
proportion. A recent survey of 58 Connecticut physicians sued for
malpractice disclosed not a single instance in which a doctor was forced
to move his practice. Only one of these physicians stated that his
practice was injured (although back to normal in less than two years),
and five reported that their practices actually improved following the
actions against them. The practices of the remaining 52 were un-
affected.89 Not only are income and prestige quickly recovered after an
adverse malpractice claim,40 but an American Medical Association
survey indicates that "only a small proportion found difficulty in
obtaining or renewing insurance following a claim or suit."'
answering a "doctor in the house" call, a survey conducted by the Law-Medicine Re-
search Institute of Boston University of 10%. of the practicing physicians in Massachu-
setts, indicated that 15% believed this to be an important factor in not responding, and
35% indicated that this would be considered in reaching a decision. Doctor & Law,
June 1961, p. 2.
Of the physicians who answered a questionnaire circulated by the Law Department
of the AMA in 1963, 53.3% stated that they would furnish emergency medical care
to a stranger away from their office or hospital, and 46.7% indicated that they would
not. These statistics were constant regardless of the presence or absence of a "Good
Samaritan" law. AMA News, Oct. 26, 1964, p. 14, col. 2.
at See, Comment, 43 B.U.L. REv. 140 (1963).
36 Amot., 141 A.L.R. 5 (1942).
37 Shindell, Medicine Versus Law: A Proposal for Settlement, 151 A.M.A.J. 1078,
1079 (1953). See Note, 77 HAnv. L. REv. 333 (1963).
38 Dr. Russell S. Fisher, in Malpractice Actions and Prophylaxis, 1 MEDICOLEGAL
DIGEST 9 (Sept. 1960), reflects the physician's primary and incurable concern by
pointing out that "Anyone can commence action against a physician, and whether it
gets far in the courts or not, a suit is an expensive nuisance to the defendant."30 Doctor & Law, Supra note 34.
40 Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Saturday Evening Post, April 25, 1959,
p. 120.
41 Analysis of Professional Liability Claims and Suits, 165 A.M.A.J. 608, 612 (1957).
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An analysis of these factors, weighed against the clamor for the
passage of such legislation, compels the conclusion that the require-
ments which the law imposes upon a physician are grossly misunder-
stood; as the following consideration of medical professional liability
in Washington indicates, no single group occupies a more favorable
position at law than members of the medical profession., 2
DEVELOPMENT OF MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
Although today the basic tenent underlying medical professional
liability is that a physician is not liable merely because of a bad result,"8
in ancient times the physician was an insurer. An example is the oft
quoted Hammurabi Code, written between 2084 and 2081 B.C., which
provided that:
If a doctor has treated a man with a metal knife for a severe wound, and
has caused the man to die, or has opened a man's tumour with a metal
knife and destroyed the man's eye, his hands shall be cut off."4
In contrast, the Washington court has expressly advised that "a physi-
cian is not an insurer of a cure ... and is not to be held liable as for
negligence or malpractice for mere failure to cure, .... ,,45
While the early development of medical liability was founded upon
the contractual obligations of one practicing a common calling,46 today
the contract between the physician and patient is pleaded merely to
establish the necessary relationship. The gravamen of an action against
a physician is a breach of the legal duty implied from the contractual
A recent study conducted by the American Medical Association's Law Department
indicates that (of the physicians reporting) 5.7% carried no professional liability in-
surance. AMA News, Oct. 12, 1964, p. 14, col. 1.
42 "By and large, a study of court decisions on the question of malpractice demon-
strates that our judges are quite keenly aware of the problems which the physician faces
in the constant emergencies arising in the course of his day-to-day practice and reveals
a definite tendency to be very strict in requiring plaintiffs to prove their cases by
a clear preponderance of the evidence. This may not seem to be the case in some of
the more recent cases in a few jurisdictions, but it really is so in the country at large."
Doctor & Law, Nov. 1958, pp. 1, 2.
42 In Lorenz v. Booth, 84 Wash. 550, 556, 147 Pac. 31, 33 (1915), the court stated
that "a mere bad result is not of itself ordinarily sufficient to render an attending
physician liable for negligence, that is, it is not ordinarily of itself proof of such negli-
gence." See also, Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wn.2d 14, 163 P.2d 148 (1945) ; Derr v. Bonney,
38 Wn.2d 678, 231 P.2d 637 (1951) ; Richison v. Nunn, 57 Wn.2d 1, 340 P.2d 793 (1959).
44 EDWARDS, THE HAMMURABI CODE 39,40 (3rd ed. 1921).
45 Dishman v. Northern Pac. Ben. Ass'n., 96 Wash. 182, 187, 164 Pac. 943, 945
(1917), (negligence alleged for the failure to suture severed tendons in the plaintiff's
hand and wrist).
46 McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REV. 549
(1959) ; STETLER & MORITZ, op. cit. supra note 26, at 306.
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relation 7 and not of the contract itself,' and the action sounds in tort."
The court's denial of the applicability of contract principles" while of
advantage to the physician insofar as the action must be brought within
three years from the time of the wrongful act5 1 or it is barred," (the
471n Dahl v. Wagner, 87 Wash. 492, 496, 151 Pac. 1079, 1080 (1915), the defendant
physician had successfully treated the plaintiff's injured foot, but suit was brought upon
his failure to subsequently take measures to restore the foot's function. The court
stated that the physician "was under contract to treat appellant. His duty was a con-
tinuing duty, continuing to the limit of reasonable professional ability." The court then
entered a judgment for only the cost of the operation necessary to relieve the plaintiff-
appellant's suffering, admitting that the case was one of first impression.
48 In Barker v. Weeks, 182 Wash. 384, 47 P.2d 1 (1935), the plaintiff was allowed
to recover money paid to a physician for medical treatment where he had falsely repre-
sented the plaintiff's physical condition in order to secure employment. The contract
was held to be "without consideration."
491n Schuster v. Sutherland, 92 Wash. 135, 158 Pac. 730 (1916), the plaintiff was
allowed to recover damages for breach of contract where the defendant physician failed
to remove all of the plaintiff's gallstones as he had expressly promised. The court, in
Yeager v. Dunnavan, 26 Wn.2d 559, 565, 174 P.2d 755, 758 (1946), held that, if before
commencing the operation the defendant "had repudiated his agreement and refused
to perform it, the gravamen of the plaintiff's action would then have been ex contractu.
However, such was not the case. The defendant did undertake performance. Immedi-
ately, the legal duty of care devolved upon him. His failure, then, to remove the gall-
stones, was misfeasance in the form of a negligent omission to do what he should have
done .... Thus, the gravamen of the plaintiff's cause of action sounded in tort and the
wrongful omission was negligence under the circumstances."
See also, Hoffman v. Watkins, 78 Wash. 118, 138 Pac. 664 (1914), holding the
physician to a duty of care, even though his services are gratuitous.
Uo While this is generally true, as pointed out by Hirsh, Consent to Medical Treat-
inent-With Forins, 1961 TRAL, LAw. GuImE 51, 75. "A physician may expressly
agree to accomplish a particular result or effect a cure. If the physician enters into
such a contract and fails to bring about the result or to effect a cure, he is liable for
breach of contract even though he uses the highest possible professional skill." The
applicability of this rule, in Washington, is suspect in light of the court's rationale in
Yeager v. Dunnavan, ibid.
51 RCW 4.16.080(2). See Rundin v. Sells, 1 Wn.2d 332, 95 P.2d 1023 (1939), where
the court held that notwithstanding a written contract, the action was for malpractice
and governed by the three year statute of limitations.
In Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wn.2d 675, 676, 277 P.2d 724, 725 (1954), the court held
that the statute of limitations begins to run from the time of the wrongful act because,
"like any other action founded upon a breach of duty imposed either by law or contract,
the action arises out of the breach, and the statute of limitations begins to run from the
time of the breach and not from the time of its discovery." The court denied that leaving
a surgical sponge in a hernia incision was continuing negligence such that the statute
did not start to run until discovery.
In the imposition of a time limit upon assertion of a cause of action, balance must
be maintained between giving the claimant ample time and fostering peace and repose
and the preservation of reliable evidence. The rule announced by the Washington court
is particularly harsh where the injury was such that it could not be discovered sooner;
other jurisdictions have attempted to solve this and other related problems by ad-
vancing the starting day. Thus the statute of limitations has been held to begin to
run on: "the last day of successive contributing injury; the end of continuous treat-
ment; the termination of continuous surgeon-patient relationship; and the day of
discovery or when a diligent person would have discovered the malpractice." Comment,
13 CLav-M a. L. R. 313, 314-15 (1964). See also Note, 1 WASHBURNE L. J. 257(1962).
SG2See: McCoy v. Stevens, 182 Wash. 55, 44 P.2d 797 (1935); Rundin v. Sells, 1
Wn.2d 332, 95 P2d 1023 (1939); and Lindquist v. Mullen, 45 Wn2d 675, 277 P.2d 724(1954).
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six year provision" being inapplicable even though the contract was in
writing) has favored the patient since the necessary relationship, and
the resulting duty of care, arises from the physician's undertaking treat-
ment, without respect to a promise or payment of compensation. This
has allowed the charity patient to avoid the rule of Thorne v. Deas 4
that gratuitous promises are unenforceable. (The failure of a physician
to respond to a request for aid, with or without a promise to that effect,
is discussed infra.)
While the duty of care imposed upon a physician has thus been held
independent of financial benefit 5 and rests in tort as opposed to con-
tract, "malpractice" antedates the development of the principles gov-
erning personal injury actions, such that it has become a "special
branch of negligence."" The first reported case in English law dates
to 1374,57 while in 1794 a Connecticut court considered the liability of a
physician for the death of a woman upon whom he had performed a
mastectomy (excision of the breast) "in the most unskillful, ignorant
and cruel manner, contrary to all the well known rules and principles of
practice in such cases,"5 " and allowed a judgment for the plaintiff.
Today the term medical malpractice is defined as "a failure upon the
part of a physician to properly perform the duty which devolves upon
him in his professional relationship with his patients which results in
some injury to the patient."6 Three essentials are required to establish
liability: (1) the existence of the physician-patient relationship; (2)
the breach of a duty which the law ascribes to such relationship; and
(3) an injury causally connected to the breach, occasioning damage to
5
3 RCW 4.16.040 (2). See also Rundin v. Sells, Ibid.
544 Johns. 84 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1809).
55 McCoid, supra note 46, at 555.
56 Walker v. Rynd, 46 Wn2d 226, 232, 280 P.2d 259, 263 (1955). This case held
that a physician's responsibility for his nurse's negligence in seating a patient in a
chair from which she fell was governed by ordinary negligence principles, and not by
the rules relating to malpractice actions.
5 Y.B. Hill, 48 Edw. III, f. 6, pl. 11 (1374). Cited in McCoid, supra note 46, at
550. See also, Stetler, History of Reported Medical Professional Liability Cases, 30
TEMP. L.Q. 366 (1957).
58 Cross v. Guthrey, 2 Root 90, 91 (Conn. 1794).
59 This term, and its malevolent connotation-rarely the basis for such an action-
has fallen into disfavor with the writers in this area. "Malpractice is malicious and
malodorous. The term has a connotation of evil, of malevolence. As soon as you hear
it, your hair bristles, your jaw juts out and up comes your dukes. It's a fighting word,
carrying with it, in common parlance, an element of contamination." O'Connor, "Mal-
practice'"-Ans Evil Word, 1 IMEDICOLEGAL DIGEST 20 (1960).
60 STETLER & MORITZ, op. cit. supra note 26, at 305. The court has held the rules
governing physicians and surgeons apply to dentists, such that "a dentist is bound to
bestow upon his patient that degree of care, skill and diligence which dentists in his line
of practice in the general neighborhood or in similar localities ordinarily exercise in
like cases." Hill v. Parker, 12 Wn.2d 517, 528, 122 P2d 476, 482 (1942).
[VOL.. 39
MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
the patient.6 Upon all these matters, the plaintiff has the burden of
proof, 2 and in this lies the physician's great advantage.
PHYSICIAN-PATeNT RELATIONSHIP
Although the court has recognized that:
So long as the relation of physician and patient exists, however that
relation was formed or whether the service was gratuitous or for an
expected fee, the physician owes his patient the same measure of duty
and the same degree of care and skill and is to the same extent answerable
for the failure of its exercise to the injury of the patient, 8
no Washington case has been found turning upon the existence of this
relationship." Yet proof of the relationship is essential since it is the
relationship which establishes the physician's duty of care; and while it
generally arises as the result of a voluntary agreement between the
parties, it may arise when the physician has been retained for a patient's
benefit by another.65 As previously noted, a physician may choose
whom he will serve, and is under no obligation to extend his services
though they be vitally needed.66 The law makes no attempt to "enforce
unselfishness or make one man serve his fellows."6 Thus, where
another's peril is not connected with the defendant's conduct, the law
has traditionally found no duty to take even a reasonable precaution to
alleviate the peril, though this be within the defendant's power." How-
ever immoral this may be, such a rule is required by the absence of
definite criteria for designating fault and preventing the indiscriminate
imposition of liability."
Corresponding to this absence of a duty to aid, is the rule which
provides that having volunteered assistance, one must "avoid any
61 LONG, TnE PHysIcIAN AND THE LAW 11 (2nd ed. 1959).
62 LONG, op. cit. supra. See discussion infra.63 Hoffman v. Watkins, 78 Wash. 118, 122, 138 Pac. 664, 665 (1914).
64 See Miller v. Dumod, 24 Wash. 648, 64 Pac. 804 (1901), affirming a judgment for
plaintiff, though the defendant physician denied having ever treated him.
11 DuBois v. Decker, 130 N.Y. 325,29 N.E. 313 (1891).66 Hurley v. Eddingfield, 156 Ind. 416, 59 N.E. 1058 (1901) was perhaps the first
case to announce that no obligation to respond to every call is imposed upon a physician
by virtue of his state license to practice, so as to render him liable for arbitrarily refus-
ing to attend a sick person, although no other physician is procurable. See also cases
cited in Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 432 (1958), and discussion infra.
87 2 HARE & JAxEs, TORTS § 18.6, at 1049 (1956).
68 POSSER, TORTS § 38, at 184 (2nd ed. 1955). See discussion supra note 23.
69 See Comment, 8 ALA. L. REv. 332 (1956). Indeed, at least one court has disal-
lowed an action against a person who had voluntarily undertaken to aid an injured
person on the ground that this would "allow an action against a Good Samaritan and
let a priest and Levite go free." Griswold v. Boston & M.R.R., 183 Mass. 434, 67 N.E.
354, 356 (1903).
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affirmative acts which make the situation worse."" Although the court
has seemingly not had the opportunity to so hold, it is believed that
more than this would be required of a physician, even though his serv-
ices be gratuitous.7 This is because "the physician-patient relation and
the resulting duty to use care may arise from the fact that the physician
has in fact undertaken to care for the patient." 2 Further, though it be
denied that rendering emergency care creates the physician-patient
relationship, the standard of care required would be the same.73 Just as
the conduct of a non-physician volunteer would be measured by "what
a reasonable person (having the volunteer's skill, if any 4) would do
under the circumstances,"7 the physician would be required to utilize
his skill and learning in light of the circumstances. He would not be
held to the same prudence of judgment in an emergency as under normal
conditions; for a "reasonable physician" owes a patient only "an or-
dinarily careful and thorough examination, such as the circumstances,
the condition of the patient, and the physician's opportunities for ex-
amination will permit.
7 6
The creation of the physician-patient relationship in an emergency
situation is of importance to the applicable rules of liability only insofar
as this relates to problems of termination and abandonment-a problem
which is an ethical as well as a legal one. For, once the physician under-
takes the care of a patient, ethically "he may not neglect him; and
unless he has been discharged he may discontinue his services only after
giving adequate notice."7 If it be determined that emergency treat-
ment does not create the relationship recognized by law, then as one
authority urges, after having rendered first-aid, his services end there,
and "the rendition of emergency treatment does not constitute accept-
ance of a patient with future responsibility. . . . (He) could not be
70 PROSSER, TORTS § 38, at 185 (2nd ed. 1955). See also Annot., 64 A.L.R2d 1179
(1959).
71 Professor Prosser notes that if one attempts to aid in an emergency, "and takes
control of the situation, he is regarded as entering voluntarily into a relation of respon-
sibility. The same is true, of course, of a physician who accepts a charity patient.
Such a defendant will then be liable for a failure to use reasonable care for the pro-
tection of the plaintiff's interests; and the good Samaritan may find himself liable
where those who passed by on the other side will not." PROSSER, TORTS § 38, at 186
(2nd ed. 1955).
72 McCoid, supra note 46, at 555.
73 CUSUMANO, MALPRACTICE LAW DISSECTED FOR QUICK GRASPING 29 (1962).
74 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 16.6, at 919 (1956). 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 299,
comments b, d, f. (1934).
75 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 16.2, at 902 (1956).76 In re Johnson's Estate, 145 Neb. 333, 16 N.W.2d 504, 510 (1944).
,7 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, op. cit. supra note 32.
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charged with having abandoned the patient."78 Because one who ren-
ders emergency aid is generally held to only a duty to refrain from
making conditions worse (though in this reasonable care is required),
the extension of responsibility with respect to a physician should not in
good conscience encompass a continuing duty." In all other situations,
the rule is well settled that the relation of physician and patient, once
initiated, continues until it is ended by the consent of the parties or
revoked by the dismissal of the physician," or until the latter's services
are no longer needed."s Of course, the physician has the right to with-
draw from a case, but this may be done only after giving the patient
reasonable notice so as to enable him to secure other medical attend-
ance. Such a withdrawal does not constitute abandonment.
8 2
Abandonment may be defined as the termination of the physician-
patient relationship "without sufficient notice or adequate excuse,"8 "
and this constitutes an actionable dereliction of duty when evidence is
introduced from which damages occasioned thereby (excluding dis-
appointment and mental anguish)" may be inferred. Only in rare
instances is this evidentiary requirement waived; for example, where
the defendant physician admits that the patient's condition was then
in dire need of attention."
By definition, abandonment is to be distinguished from the failure
to administer treatment because of a mistake in judgment as to its
78 CUSUmANO, op. cit. supra note 73, at 29.
71 If such continuing duty be found, then "Good Samaritan" legislation might
acquire credibility. It is suggested that a statute such as H.B. 103-that "a person
who renders emergency care to an injured, or physically ill person at any time during
the period the injured or ill person was first discovered until he is placed in a home,
hospital or institution for care, shall not be liable for civil damages as a result of any
negligent acts or omissions in rendering such emergency care, except for gross negli-
gence,"-would be inadequate in rectifying that development.
80 In Williams v. Wurdemann, 71 Wash. 390, 393, 128 Pac. 639, 640 (1912), the
court stated that "When being improperly treated, the patient is at liberty to quit at
any time, and he may hold the physician liable for the injuries suffered by him because
of the improper treatment, notwithstanding it is highly probable that the physician,
had the patient continued his treatment, would sooner or later have discovered that his
treatment was improper and would so have modified it as to effect a cure."
81 Committee on Medicolegal Problems, Professional Liability and the Physician,
183 A.M.A.J. 695 (Feb. 1963). See also, Annot., 57 A.L.R.2d 432 (1958). In Brooks
v. Herd, 144 Wash. 173, 257 Pac. 238 (1927), the court held that the discharge of a
patient before he was cured could render the defendant (drugless healer) liable.
82 LoNG, op. cit. supra note 61, at 7.83 Gray v. Davidson, 15 Wn2d 257, 267, 130 P2d 341, 345 (1942).
84 In Brooks v. Herd, supra note 81, the court found error in an instruction to the
effect that plaintiff might recover damages for mental anguish or suffering, when
nothing but physical injury was alleged or shown.
And, in Skodje v. Hardy, 47 Wn.2d 557, 288 P.2d 471 (1955), the court held that
the defendant's alleged abandonment was not actionable because it led to no delay or
other detrimental result.85 Ricks v. Budge, 91 Utah 307, 64 P.2d 208 (1937).
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necessity."' This is not an instance of unauthorized termination. s7
Also, because abandonment is predicated upon the existence of the
physician-patient relationship, it cannot be cited as the basis of an
action where a physician, in the first instance, fails to visit a patient
after promising to do so, and where, but for this promise, the patient
could and would have secured services elsewhere. Here, except as to
charity patients denied the enforcement of grauitous promises," re-
covery follows the satisfaction of general negligence principles, i.e.,
where the patient's "reliance is both reasonable and foreseeable and
where defendant should also foresee an unreasonable likelihood of
harm to him as the result of it... ."" Although, as a matter of policy,
the determination that charity patients have no claim in such a situa-
tion is acceptable, the "gratuitous promise" rationale seems spurious.
Even admitting that recovery here is tantamount to enforcing a gra-
tuitous promise, liability is nevertheless predicated upon the risk
created, and thus upon the law of negligence. If recovery is to be
disallowed because of policy considerations, it would be more logical
merely to say as much instead of subjecting a tort determination to a
contractual nicety such as "want of consideration." Of course, as the
following discussion indicates, matters ex contractu continue to play a
valid and important role in the disposition of medical professional
liability problems.
Despite the metamorphosis from contract to tort as the basis of
medical professional liability, the contract of employment may still
8 6 In commenting upon this McCoid, suipra note 46, at 557, notes that "Although
some attempt may be made to distinguish between 'abandonment' of the patient,...
and a failure to use proper care in the treatment of a patient, the line is not clearly
drawn."
Closely allied with the failure to administer treatment based upon a mistaken judg-
ment as to its necessity are those cases relating to a wrong diagnosis. Since a physi-
cian is not liable for his honest errors in judgment, a wrong diagnosis is actionable
only where the physician failed to properly inform himself of the attendant facts and
circumstances (as in Peterson v. Hunt, 197 Wash. 255, 84 P.2d 999 (1938)-failure to
apply the "rabbit" test in suspected pregnancy) or if improper treatment arises there-
from. (See Peddicord v. Lieser, 5 Wn.2d 190, 105 P.2d 5 (1940). In McDonald v.
Camas Prairie Ry. Co., 180 Wash. 555, 38 P.2d 515 (1935), the court indicated that
failure to make a proper diagnosis, without more, would constitute a breach of the
duty of care.)
87 In Skeel v. Davidson, 18 Wn.2d 358, 139 P.2d 301 (1943), a child was released
from the defendant's office only a few hours following a tonsilectomy, and while still
bleeding. The judgment was based on negligent treatment, as opposed to abandonment.
88 Thorne v. Deas, supra note 54.
89 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 18.6, 1045 (1956). In Seavey, Reliance upon Gratui-
tous Promises or Other Conduct, 64 HARV. L. REv. 913, 919 (1951), the author states
"one who represents that he will extend aid to a helpless person is responsible for the
harm caused by the failure to receive the aid if, but for the defendant's conduct, aid
would have been rendered by others."
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prescribe the extent of the physician's duty with respect to its termina-
tion. For, "a physician who is employed only for a specific occasion or
service is under no duty to continue his visits or treatment thereafter,
and is not liable for abandonment if he ceases treatment. '90
The physician-patient relationship also ordains the treatment au-
thorized and constitutes an essential determination in establishing
assault and battery. The basis of an action for battery is "the absence
of consent to the contact on the part of the plaintiff."9 1 Thus liability is
imposed for a technical assault and battery if the physician acts without
proper consent, even though in complete good faith and for the patient's
benefit.92 The law is clear that a physician is not privileged to exceed
the consent given or reasonably to be implied;" however, in an emer-
gency, where it is impracticable to obtain express consent (either from
the patient or one authorized to speak for him) a physician is priv-
ileged' to furnish such treatment as is reasonably necessary.95 An in-
teresting development in this respect was the contention in Huttner v.
MacKay,9" that the consent to a craniotomy was exceeded by the per-
formance of an "exploratory craniotomy." The court disposed of this
allegation by finding that:
where a doctor is authorized to remove a tumor by means of a craniotomy
and finds, during the operation, that it cannot be removed without grave
risk to the life of his patient, the authority to remove the tumor carries
with it the implied authority not to do so where death would be a most
probable result.97
While there is opinion to the effect that an action for unauthorized
treatment is not based on malpractice,9" the Washington rule is that
although "an unauthorized operation is, in contemplation of law, an
90 Annot., 57 A.L.R2d 432, 460 (1958).
91 PRoss~m, TORTS § 9, at 32 (2nd ed. 1955).
92 Committee on Medicolegal Problems, supra note 81, at 698. See also LoNG, op.
cit. supra note 61, at 28.
The classic case is Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 104 N.W. 12 (1905), deter-
mining that consent to operate upon a patient's right ear did not extend to an operation
upon the left ear. An interesting case in this respect is Crippen v. Pulliam, 61 Wn.2d
725, 380 P.2d 475 (1963) where the plaintiff alleged that the defendant exceeded his
authority by operating upon the right ear when the hospital record introduced into
evidence showed a notation by the defendant to operate on the left ear. The court
held this evidence, without explanation, inconclusive where it was inconsistent with
written consent which in no way limited the tympanoplasty to the left ear.
9 8 PRossER, TORTS § 18, at 85 (2nd ed. 1955).94 Although some speak of implied consent, this is a fiction to which privilege is
preferred. PRossza, TORTS § 18, at 84 (2nd ed. 1955).
95 Committee on Medicolegal Problems, supra note 81, at 698.
go 48 Wn.2d 378, 293 P.2d 766 (1956).
071d. at 388, 293 P2d at 772.9 8 LONG, op. cit. supra note 61, at 28.
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assault and battery, it also amounts to malpractice.. .. "" Seemingly
this is true only insofar as the personal injury statute of limitations..0
is applicable, as opposed to the statute pertaining to assault and bat-
tery.' The nature of the action, and the nature and burden of proof
both upon the affirmative issue and upon damages, is that of assault and
battery to the exclusion of the duty of care required of physicians.0 2
(Of course, this could be rectified by reasoning that unauthorized
treatment amounts to a per se departure from that standard.)
PHYsIcIAN's DUTY OF CARE
The existence of contractual implications, combined with the correla-
tive physician-patient relationship, has resulted in the genesis of mal-
practice as a "special kind of negligence." Despite the malevolent
connotations of the term "malpractice," in providing for the recovery
of damages the law seeks to compensate an injured party, not to punish
the defendant.0 3 There is, of course, a culpable element in the deter-
mination of liability, since negligence is defined as "conduct... which
falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others
against unreasonable risk of harm.' 0 4 To measure this standard, the
law has created the "reasonably prudent man"-an abstraction, an
objective standard embodying "the normal standard of community be-
havior.""' Since negligence does not exist in nature, it cannot exist
without knowledge. For, if the actor does not foresee an unreasonable
risk of injury, or could not foresee it if he conducted himself as a "rea-
sonably prudent man," there is no negligence and no basis for li-
ability.0 6 Because the "reasonably prudent man" is not wholly an
99 Physicians' and Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wn.2d 38, 40, 111 P.2d 568,
569 (1941). And this is true, even though negligence is not charged.
100 RCW 4.16.080(2), prescribing a three year period.
101 RCW 4.16.100(1), prescribing a two year period.
102 STETLER & MoIdTz, DOCTOR AND PATIENT AND THE LAW 221 (4th ed. 1962)
indicate that expert testimony is not required in the following actions: "(1) an opera-
tion performed without consent,... (7) breach of contract to cure or to effect a certain
result, or (8) cases in which there has been an admission of lack of skill or of negli-
gence on the part of the defendant."
103 However, as indicated in Marshall, The Unreality of Accident Litigatio,n: A
Plea For A New Approach, 50 A.B.A.J. 713, 716 (1964), the question of liability is
one of fault having punitive originations. The damages to be awarded are, however,
compensatory-"scaled to the plaintiff's injuries rather than to the degree of wrong
done by the defendant."
104 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 282, at 738 (1934). The reasonableness of any risk,
and the amount of caution "demanded of a person by an occasion is the resultant of
three factors: the likelihood that his conduct will injure others, taken with the
seriousness of the injury if it happens, and balanced against the interest which he
must sacrifice to avoid the risk." Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F2d 611, 612 (2d Cir. 1940).
105 2 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 162, at 902 (1956).
1062 HARPER & JAMES, TORTS § 16.5, at 907 (1956). The Washington court, how-
[VOL. 39
MEDICAL PROFESSIONAL LIABILITY
objective standard, but is subjective in the sense that "if an actor has
more than reasonable skill, he must probably exercise that which he
has," 7 the foreseeability test is obscured' by the creation of the "rea-
sonably prudent physician" and the imposition of a duty to exercise
"that degree of skill and learning which is possessed by the average
member of the profession in the community in which he practices.' 0 9
Because of the special relationship between physician and patient,
and because of the physician's superior knowledge, the doctrines of
assumption of risk and contributory negligence have little application
to an action for malpractice."0 These two doctrines, based upon the
puritanical notion that one at fault should not profit by his own wrong,
deprive the plaintiff of recourse against the defendant by relieving the
defendant of any duty towards the plantiff. Yet between physician and
patient,
The very relation assumes trust and confidence on the part of the patient
in the capacity and skill of the physician; and it would indeed require an
unusual state of facts to render a person who is possessed of no medical
skill guilty of contributory negligence because he accepts the word of his
physician and trusts in the efficacy of the treatment prescribed by him."'
This statement, made in response to an allegation that the plaintiff was
contributorily negligent in employing the defendant drugless healer
whom the patient knew would not operate nor advise an operation,
must be taken with reservation. Indeed, this defense is allowed where
the plaintiff fails to follow the physician's advice and is. met with ad-
versity, not the result of the physican's negligence." 2 Of course, the
ever, has taken the position that while foreseeability is a major element in the de-
termination of legal responsibility "it is not the sole consideration in attempting to set
the limits of legal responsibility in terms of cause in fact." Hosea v. Seattle, 64 Wn.2d
691, 695, 393 P.2d 967, 970 (1964). The court continues to favor "proximate cause,"
which in truth has little to do with causation, and is but a "label" applied to justify a
policy determination that one should or should not be held legally responsible for his
conduct.
1072 HARPER & JAMEs, TORTS § 16.6, at 919 (1956).
10s See discussion in the text accompanying note 135, infra.
109 Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wn.2d 14, 16, 163 P.2d 148, 150 (1945). The Oath of
Hippocrates contains the pledge that "Into whatever houses I enter, I will go into
them for the benefit of the sick, and will abstain from every voluntary act of mischief
and corruption."
"
0 KRAmER, MEicAL MALRAcrscE 34 (1962). SrTmmX & MoRtTz, op. cit. supra
note 102, at 386.
"I Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wn.2d 482, 501, 219 P.2d 79, 90 (1950). The court char-
acterized as dicta the statement in Wilcox v. Carroll, 127 Wash. 1, 6, 219 Pac. 34, 36(1923) that one who employs a drugless healer, knowing he will not operate, "cannot
be heard to complain because an operation was not performed .... "
112 "[W]hen a patient goes to a physician and accepts the professional skill of such
physician, it is the duty of the patient to follow the advice of the physician, and if he
fails to follow the advice of the physician and something untoward happens to the
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doctrine of "avoidable consequences," imposing a duty upon the plain-
tiff to mitigate damages, is applicable; but such subsequent negligence
on the part of the plaintiff "is pertinent to be shown in mitigation of
damages only where enhanced thereby, not to relieve against the
primary liability.""..8
Assumption of risk (or volenti non fit injuria as the Washington
court, for reasons known only to it, prefers) may be interposed with
respect to,
the risk of injury from medical treatment which is performed with proper
care, but.., does not apply to the risk of negligent medical treatment if
the patient has no reason to expect such negligence. 14
Although the author quoted further opines that "a patient who know-
ingly entrusts himself to the care of someone lacking in medical qual-
ifications assumes the risk arising from such lack of qualifications,""' 5
the Washington court has expressly denied this rule. Reasoning that
the practice of medicine (and drugless healing) is regulated by licensing
statutes (Title 18 RCW) promulgated in the exercise of the "police
power" to protect the public against dangers of incompetent practice,
the court stated that:
the exercise of this power is incompatible with putting the individual
to the hazard of risking incompetence in the selection of persons to treat
him. It is the purpose of licensing laws to eliminate all incompetent per-
sons who hold themselves out to treat the public. The assumption of risk
doctrine is never applicable in such situations." 6
Thus, except as negated by the application of these doctrines, the
duty of care owed by the physician is the exercise of that degree of skill
and learning which is possessed by the average member of the profes-
sion in the community in which he practices."7 Yet just as the "rea-
sonably prudent physician" owes a greater duty of care and skill than
the "reasonably prudent man," (this, because of the physician's exper-
patient which would not have happened or was not the physician's negligence, then the
physician would not be liable; and if the plantiff failed to follow the advice of the
doctor and thereby aggravated the ailment, the jury should find for the defendant."
Brooks v. Herd, 144 Wash. 173, 177, 257 Pac. 238, 239-40 (1927).
See also: Williams v. Wurdemann, 71 Wash. 390, 128 Pac. 639 (1912) ; Swanson
v. Hood, 99 Wash. 506, 170 Pac. 135 (1918).
I's Sauers v. Smits, 49 Wash. 557, 561, 95 Pac. 1097, 1099 (1908).
114 STEnLER & MomTz, op. cit. supra note 102, at 387.
"15 Id. at 388.
118 Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wn.2d 482, 502, 219 P.2d 79, 90 (1950).
"IT As previously noted, a similar standard of skill and care is applicable to dentists.
Hill v. Parker, 12 Wn.2d 517, 122 P.2d 476 (1942).
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ise) a specialist is held to a higher degree of care than a general
practitioner. 18 One who holds himself out' 9 as having special knowl-
edge and skill in the treatment of a particular organ, disease, or class of
persons, is required to discharge his duty with that degree of skill and
learning ordinarily possessed and used by specialists engaged in like
practice in the same community'2 0
Conversely, upon the theory that degrees of skill vary with the
locality, the care required is prescribed by the particular "community"
in which the defendant practices. While the court early found error
in an instruction making the standard of treatment "that of the locality
alone in which the appellant was practicing; whereas, the true standard
is that of all similar localities,"'' the court has not at all been con-
sistent in this requirement. In 1924 the standard was declared to be
that of the "same neighborhood;"' 22 in 1945 it was said to be that of
the "community" in which the defendant practiced; 22 while a recent
pronouncement, and that which is believed preferred, refers to "the
same, or a similar, area or locality."'2 Although it is argued that this
doctrine is outmoded and abrogated by the nonrecognition of such a
rule by physicians, the uniformity of state licensing examinations, and
the uniformity of the governing canons of ethics,'25 it is advanced that
the distinction recognizes an existing variance of skill properly within
the subjective facet of the "reasonably prudent physician.""
Similar distinctions with regard to the physician's duty of care have,
however, succumbed with the advent of modem medicine. While early
"I" Atins v. Clein, 3 Wn.2d 168, 100 P2d 1 (1940). See also 2 ExcYcLoPEDIA OF
NEGLIGENCE, § 418, at 1186 (1962). Klodek v. May Creek Logging Co., 71 Wash. 573,
129 Pac. 99 (1913) concerned an action for malpractice for injuries arising from the
physician's treatment of the plaintiff's injured patella. Evidence was introduced at the
trial that the physician had advertised his specialty as being eye and nose. The court
stated that the fact that the physician was specializing in other branches of the pro-
fession was a circumstance relevant to the issue.
229 In Sears v. Lydon, 169 Wash. 92, 13 P.2d 475 (1932), a drugless healer was held
to the standard of a bone specialist because he held himself out as an expert in bone
surgery.
120 Aldns v. Clein, supra note 118.
121 Cranford v. O'Shea, 75 Wash. 33, 35, 134 Pac. 486, 487 (1913).
122 Kemp v. McGillivray, 129 Wash, 592, 225 Pac. 631 (1924).
123 Fritz v. Horsfall, supra note 109.
124 Teig v. St. John's Hospital, 63 Wn.2d 369, 375, 387 P2d 527, 531 (1963).
125 Goldman, Malpractice Cases i Massachusetts, 40 MAss. L.Q. 27 (May 1955).
See also Belli, An Ancient Therapy Still Applied: The Silent Medical Treatment, 1
VmL. L. REV. 250 (1956).
12 In Huttner v. MacKay, 48 Wn2d 378, 293 P2d 766 (1956), the court rejected
the testimony of an "anatomist" to the effect that a Seattle neurosurgeon was negligent
in his treatment of the plaintiff, on the grounds that the anatomist was not practicing
in Seattle at the time of the alleged wrong, and because there was no showing that he
was familiar with the accepted practices of neurosurgeons in the performance of
craniotomies.
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cases confined the duty of care to the "school of thought of which the
alleged practitioner is a member,"'2 7 supposedly upon the basis that the
jury was not qualified to evaluate either the tenets of the conflicting
schools or the preferred method of treatment,"' with the passing of the
"war that raged between the homeopaths and allopaths ... in the dark
age of medicine""' the distinction between the schools has lost much of
its meaning. Indeed, today the rationale of that rule "is applicable
only where doctors are concerned who are equal in their qualification,
and where no recourse can be had to higher learning or greater ex-
perts."". ° While the court seemingly has had no occasion to consider a
specialist's testifying against a general practitioner,"' in Swanson v.
Hood"' an osteopath was allowed to testify against an M.D. and assess
the latter's treatment in light of the M.D.'s own school; the witness was
not disqualified merely because he belonged to another school or
because he was unlicensed to perform similar treatment.
CAUSAL CONNECTION-THE NECESSITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
Since the court has long recognized that a physician is not an insurer
of a cure and is not to be held liable for mere "bad results,''.. the
standard of medical practice in the same, or similar, locality must be
determined along with the defendant's failure to follow the methods pre-
scribed by that standard."' It is in this requirement that "malpractice"
assumes its unique character, since a standard of care is established-
the breach of which is negligence-without specific regard to the ele-
127 Wilcox v. Carroll, 127 Wash. 1, 12, 219 Pac. 34, 37 (1923). In Ennis v. Banks,
95 Wash. 513, 519, 164 Pac. 58, 60 (1917), the court, in an action alleging the defendant
guilty of malpractice in giving a diet of poached egg and toast to a typhoid fever
patient, stated: "Each school of medicine is entitled to practice in its own way, and
because one does not use the methods of the other is no reason for holding the one for
malpractice."
See also Corey v. Radabaugh, 143 Wash. 653, 255 Pac. 1037 (1927), where it was
held error to instruct the jury that they should consider "the advanced state of practice
in such line of science (here, drugless healing) at the time."
128 McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Practitioners, 12 VAND. L. REv. 549
(1959).
129 Kelly v. Carroll, 36 Wn.2d 482, 496, 219 P.2d 79, 87 (1950).
i30 Ibid.
131 See Goldman, supra note 125.
12 99 Wash. 506, 170 Pac. 135 (1918).
13 Dishman v. Northern Pac. Ben. Ass'n., 96 Wash. 182, 187, 164 Pac. 943, 945
(1917). The development of this rule has probably swept away such cases as Peterson
v. Wells, 41 Wash. 693, 84 Pac. 608 (1906), where a bad result was held to establish a
"prima facie" case of malpractice (this, without res ipsa loquitur). See also Hoffman
v. Watkins, 78 Wash. 118, 138 Pac. 664 (1914), where a judgment for plaintiff was
reversed for the error of the court in refusing to instruct the jury that negligence
could not be inferred nor presumed from the failure to effect a cure.
"3 Cochran v. Harrison Memorial Hospital, 42 Wn.2d 264, 254 P.2d 752 (1953).
Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wn.2d 14, 16, 163 P.2d 148, 150 (1945).
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ment of foreseeability. (The defendant is presumed to possess the
requisite knowledge and recognition of the risk of harm-this is
established by the "standard of practice" in the locality. It is the
doing of something which this standard forbids or the failure to do
what the standard requires that constitutes negligence.)"'5 That a
physician does not incur liability for his mistakes if he has used methods
recognized and approved by those reasonably skilled in the profession138
becomes a matter of singular importance insofar as the "standard" and
the departure therefrom13' usually must be established by medical
testimony.3 ' To inform the jury of the criteria upon which the stand-
and of ordinary skill and diligence rests, evidence must be introduced
which, from the very nature of the case, must come from men learned
in the profession; this, because other witnesses are simply not com-
petent to give it.
Jurors and courts are not in any way conversant with what is entirely
peculiar to the practice of medicine and surgery. They may not arbi-
trarily determine the proper methods of treating an ailment-that is a
medical question. 3 9
Thus, not only has the medical expert 40 come to play an increasingly
important role in personal injury litigation,"1 his participation is essen-
133 Fritz v. Horsfall, supra note 134.
1s6 Ibid.
1 37 1n Brooks v. Herd, 144 Wash. 173, 257 Pac. 238 (1927), the court disallowed
evidence of negligence on the part of the physician in other cases.
138 Fritz v. Horsfall, supra note 134. See also Arnot., 141 A.L.R. 5 (1942).
There are several Washington cases which, although recognizing this rule, have held
it inapplicable. See: Helland v. Bridenstine, 55 Wash. 470, 104 Pac. 626 (1909),
where the plaintiff was infected with gonorrhea as a result of the defendant's using an
unsterilized instrument; Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235 (1913),
'where a twelve-inch spring was left in the patient's uterus; Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119
Wash. 573, 205 Pac. 1059 (1922), where a broken bone was so improperly joined that
negligence was apparent to a layman; but, in Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d 737, 258
P.2d 472 (1953), the rule of those cases was held inapplicable where the defendant's
voice became hoarse and low-pitched following the removal of two growths from his
vocal cords. The latter presented a "medical question." See discussion of res ipsa
loquitur at pp. 727-29 infra.
1L39 Fritz v. Horsfall, 24 Wn2d 14, 18, 163 P.2d 148 150-151 (1945).
140 Miley B. Wesson, writing in Medical Malpractice Suits: A Physicial's Primerfor Defendants, 8 CLEzv.-MAn. L. R•v. 254, 259 (1959), facetiously notes that not every
man can qualify as a plaintiff's attorney's "house doctor." "He must be money hungry
and with little or no private practice, a name dropper (both of individuals and clubs),
a graduate of a good medical school, a member of his county medical society, have
made one or two trips abroad, and hence be able to claim to have taken postgraduate
courses in a number of famous foreign universities, all of whose records were destroyed
during the war.. .!
141. Stetler, The Doctor Takes The Witness Stand, 1 Ma IcoLEGAL DIGEST 35 (May
1960), points out that "from 65 to 80 per cent of all litigation in our courts today
require some type of medical reports or testimony-and seven out of ten personal injury
cases are decided on medical rather than legal considerations." In view of such sta-
tistics, it has been suggested that, in not offering training in forensic medicine, profes-
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tial (with a few exceptions discussed below) in actions against his
colleagues.14
Although the physician is ethically required to "...expose, without
fear or favor, incompetent or corrupt, dishonest or unethical conduct on
the part of members of the profession,"'. the seriousness of a failure to
fulfill this requirement, and the disasterous consequences worked upon
a plaintiff with a meritorious claim, have occasioned a barrage of criti-
cism respecting the alleged "conspiracy of silence.""' 4 The Washington
court has recognized the difficulty in obtaining medical testimony to
substantiate the plaintiff's claim but has noted that:
this does not obviate the necessity of such testimony where the fact of
negligence is not apparent to the layman. Until some better system of
determining the issue is evolved, the plaintiffs will have to produce such
evidence if they are to prevail in suits of this nature." 5
One reaction" 6 has been the enactment of legislation... allowing medi-
cal treatises to be used as direct evidence. While both the Uniform
Rules of Evidence" and the Model Code of Evidence".. allow such use
of learned treatises, not only would this create an exception to the
hearsay rule,50 it substantively changes the law of malpractice by
infringing upon the "same, or similar locality" restriction. 5' Though
this development has been viewed with favor, because it neutralizes
sional legal educators "are already woefully behind in not having adjusted... curricula
drastically to reflect the conditions of modern legal practice." Redden, Practicable
Medico-Legal Instruction in the "Smaller School," 16 J. LEGAL ED. 444 (1964).
Indeed, the lack of medical training, and the reluctance of physicians to fill the gap,
appears to be one of the primary reasons that so many unwarranted malpractice
claims have been brought. Without medical training, and without expert advice, the
attorney is in a difficult position to judge the merit of a claim presented to him.
142 Indeed, it has been opined that "every malpractice suit, without exception, is
instigated either directly or indirectly by a doctor." Wesson, supra note 140, at 254.
143 PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, ch. III, art. 1, § 4, reprinted at 167 A.M.AJ.
20 (spec. ed. 1958). See also Allman, Impartial Medical Testimnony, 27 INS. COUNSEL
J. 184 (1960).
14 See Belli, supra note 125. Also, Note, 45 MINN. L. REv. 1019 (1961).
'45 Richison v. Nunn, 57 Wn.2d 1, 18, 340 P.2d 793, 802 (1959).
146 See Alexander, Medicine's Fearful Partnership: Miracles and Malpractice, New
York Mirror Magazine, August 9, 1959, quoted in 3 AVERBACH, HANDLING ACCIDENT
CASES 3:9-10 (1960), to the effect that legislation avoiding the necessity of expert
testimony is the result of doctors "refusal to give, voluntarily, expert testimony, by
their tendency to skirt the truth under oath when subpoenaed, and by their frequent
policy of non-disclosure of all the facts."
147MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 233, § 79C (1959); NEv. REv. STAT. § 51.040
(1961). See LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAW 267 (2nd ed. 1959).
148 UNIFP m RULES OF EVIDENCE 63(31). These rules have been recommended for
adoption in Washington. Henry, Uniform Rules of Evidence-Should They Be
Adopted? Their Effect on Local Practice, 39 WASH. L. Rxv. 380 (1964).
.49 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 529 (1942).
150 6 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1690 (3rd ed. 1940).
'5' LONG, op. cit. supra note 147, at 266-267.
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the physician's advantage and liberalizes the law of malpractice,'52 it
denies the rationale upon which this rule has long been predicated 5 '
and opens the door to abuse. In Dabroe v. The Rhodes Company,5'
the court was called upon to consider the office of medical texts and
treatises-there, "a statistical study indicating that a substantial num-
ber of people having whiplash injuries... recovered after the termin-
ation of litigation... .""' The court affirmed the rule that, although
treatises may be used for the cross-examination of experts,15 "for the
purpose of testing their knowledge and... of contradicting them or
discrediting them,"5 they are not admissible to prove the truth of the
statements contained therein. 58
While the plaintiff thus may not resort to substitute expert testimony
in proof of the affirmative issue, this may be elicited from the defendant
physician 55 And, the fact that more physicians testify for the defend-
ant than for the plaintiff is not deemed controlling, since "the question
is the weight to be given to the testimony considered in connection with
all the other evidence of the case." 6' In this respect, an instruction to
the effect that the jury was not bound by the expert's testimony, but
was to give it the weight and credit they deemed it entitled to, was
sustained against a challenge that it constituted an unconstitutional
judicial comment upon the evidence." 1 Although the jury may weigh
the expert's testimony, it will not be allowed to accept one theory
152 Goldman, Malpractice Cases in Massachusetts, 40 MASS. L.Q. 27, 31 (1955).
153 LoNG, op. cit. supra note 147, at 265-67, states the reasons behind the rule that
treatises may not be used as direct evidence to be: "1, textbooks are necessarily
couched in technical language not understandable by laymen; 2, the author's views may
have undergone a change since the book was written; 3, the facts and symptoms upon
which the author based his opinion may have been atypical or bizarre; 4, the authors
are not under oath nor subject to cross-examination."
1564 Wn.2d 444, 392 P.2d 317 (1964).
155 Id. at 448-49, 392 P.2d at 320.
156 See Seattle-First Nat'l. Bank v. Rankin, 59 Wn2d 288, 367 P.2d 835 (1962),
where the court held that although treatises may not be used on redirect examination
for the purpose of rehabilitating the witness who had already been discredited by their
use, they may properly be used to explain certain passages which were read before thejury and to clarify possible misunderstandings by the jury which might have resulted
from the defendant's use of the books on cross-examination.
157 Dabroe v. The Rhodes Co., 64 Wn.2d 444, 450, 392 P.2d 317, 321 (1964).
158 Ibid. The court also noted that while the burden of proving that the text or
treatise is authoritative is upon the plaintiff, an expert will not be permitted to block
cross-examination by refusing to concede that a text or a treatise is authoritative.
159 See Atkins v. Clein, 3 Wn2d 168, 100 P.2d 1 (1940), and Annot., 141 A.L.R. 5,
15 (1942). In Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn2d 737, 258 P.2d 472 (1953), the defendant-
physician was called as the plaintiff's only expert witness, and since he did not testify
that he had violated the acceptable standard of practice, the court held that the only
possibility of recovery lay in the application of res ipsa loquitur.
160 Gruginski v. Lane, 177 Wash. 121, 124, 30 P2d 970, 971 (1934).
161 WASH. CONST. art. 4, § 16; Murgatroyd v. Dudley, 184 Wash. 222, 50 P.2d
1025 (1935).
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to the exclusion of the other, since the testimony of other physicians
that they would have followed a different course of treatment than that
followed by the defendant, or a disagreement of doctors of equal skill
and learning as to what the treatment should have been, does not estab-
lish negligence." 2 It is enough that the methods employed "have the
approval of at least a respectable minority of the medical profession
who recognized it..' 6
Subject to these restrictions, the plaintiff must not only prove a
causal connection between the defendant's conduct and the resultant
injury "beyond a mere possibility,"'64 but must also overcome the pre-
sumption that the defendant's conduct conformed to the requisite
standard of care. 6 ' While the court has required the plaintiff to estab-
lish the affirmative issue by more than a scintilla of evidence,' it has
not always required either direct evidence or proof of facts from which
that sought to be established is necessarily or reasonably inferred." 7
Although this has varied greatly-on occasion the court demanding
that the plaintiff prove his case by "any substantial evidence or reason-
able inference from such evidence,". 168-- the question as to the suffici-
162 Richison v. Nunn, 57 Wn.2d 1, 340 P.2d 793 (1959); Peddicord v. Lieser, 5
Wn.2d 190, 105 P.2d 5 (1940); Dahl v. Wagner, 87 Wash. 492, 151 Pac. 1079 (1915).
163 Dahl v. Wagner, 87 Wash. 492, 495, 151 Pac. 1079, 1080 (1915). See also:
Gruginski v. Lane, supra note 160, and Howatt v. Cartwright, 128 Wash. 343, 222 Pac.
496 (1924).
3
64 Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 24 (1950). In Coombs v. James, 82 Wash. 403, 406, 144
Pac. 536, 537 (1914), the court stated: "[T]he mere evidence of different causes that
could produce an injury is not sufficient, and... where circumstantial evidence is relied
upon to establish a cause of injury, it is not sufficient to show causes for which the
defendant would be liable which could have produced the injury, without showing that
it could not have been produced in any other manner or in a manner for which the
defendant would not be liable." See also Henline v. Southward, 99 Wash. 232, 169
Pac. 315 (1917), where the jury was not allowed to speculate between four causes.
But in Atkins v. Clein, .mpra note 159, in an action for wrongful death, the plaintiffs
were required to prove only that there was a greater probability that the decedent
would have lived, had he received proper treatment, than that he would have died.
165 In Malpractice-The Layman's Common Medical Knowledge and Experience
and Res Ipsa Loquitur, 7 PERSONAL INJURY COMMENTATOR 11 (1964), it is stated
that "A physician or surgeon is presumed to exercise his legal duty of ordinary skill
and care, and in the absence of proof to the contrary, it is presumed that he carefully
and skillfully treated or operated on his patient."
166 So illusive is the term "scintilla," that it may be likened to gossamer--"a filmy
cobweb floating in air."
167 See Thompson v. Virginia Mason Hospital, 152 Wash. 297, 301, 277 Pac. 691,
692 (1929), where it is stated that "a disputed question of fact, by whatever character
of evidence it is sought to be proven, must have in its support that character of evi-
dence which would convince an unpredjudiced thinking mind of the truth of fact, before
it can be said to be established." Compare Sears v. Lydon, supra note 119, holding a
malpractice action subject to non-suit if there is neither evidence nor reasonable infer-
ence therefrom to sustain a verdict.
168 McGrady v. Brink, 195 Wash. 626, 629, 81 P.2d 800, 801 (1938). Here the
patient's death was alleged to have been caused by a hemostat left in his abdomen after
an operation for "marginal ulcers." The court stated that the plaintiff did not have to
establish the material fact (of cause) "beyond a reasonable doubt."
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ency of the proof arises most often where the plaintiff seeks to invoke
the exceptions to the rule requiring expert testimony.
Though a physician is not liable for adverse results," 9 per se,7 ° this,
in connection with other facts&1 1 (such as the necessity of a subsequent
corrective operation),"' may be considered by the jury 1  Further,
the court has held that, in the nature of things, there must be "many
instances where the facts alone prove the negligence, and where it is
unnecessary to have the opinions of persons skilled in the particular
science to show unskillful and negligent treatment."'7
This doctrine had its origin in the case of Helland v. Bridenstine'7 5
where the court, after noting that the plaintiff was not required to prove
her case beyond a reasonable doubt, nor by direct and positive evi-
dence, stated that "it was only necessary to show a chain of circum-
stances from which the ultimate fact required to be established is
reasonably and naturally inferable."'7 Later the court considered
those cases involving this rule and held that in each of them "the
negligent act.., was so apparent that no expert testimony was neces-
sary to establish the negligence-that being established from the facts
alone."'1 7 While the "chain of circumstances" doctrine has fallen into
disuse,178 nevertheless, the requirement of expert testimony has been
held "sound only when soundly applied," 79 and is not imposed where
the results of the medical care and treatment bespeak negligence. In
such instances resort has been allowed to the "doctrine" of res ipsa
loquitur.
Although it is often suggested that res ipsa loquitur raises a pre-
sumption of negligence,80 or "shifts the burden of proof to the de-
169 Gruginsld v. Lane, supra note 160.
170 But see Peterson v. Wells, 41 Wash. 693, 84 Pac. 608 (1906), holding a bad
result prima facie evidence of negligence.
1712 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF NEGLIGENCE § 418, at 1185 (1962).
172 See: Gross v. Partlow, 190 Wash. 489, 68 P2d 1034 (1937); Howatt v. Cart-
wright, 128 Wash. 343, 222 Pac. 496 (1924); Sawdey v. Spokane Falls & N. Ry.,
30 Wash. 349, 70 Pac. 972 (1902).
178 Prather v. Downs, 164 Wash. 427, 2 P.2d 709 (1931). But in Brear v. Sweet,
155 Wash. 474, 475, 284 Pac. 803 (1907), the court emphasized that "the mere fact that
a bad result may follow an operation is not of itself evidence of negligence."
174 Cornwell v. Sleicher, 119 Wash. 573, 579, 205 Pac. 1059, 1061 (1922).
175 55 Wash. 470, 104 Pac. 626 (1909).
176 Id. at 475, 104 Pac. at 628. See also Matteson v. Thiel, 162 Wash. 193, 298
Pac. 333 (1931) (chain of circumstances arising from the leaving of a surgeon's
needle in the patient's abdomen following an operation).
177 Crouch v. Wyckoff, 6 Wn2d 273, 281, 107 P.2d 339, 342 (1940).
78The court refused to follow this reasoning in Richison v. Nunn, supra note 145.
But see Teig v. St. John's Hospital, 63 Wn2d 369, 387 P.2d 527 (1963), invoking
this rule.
17D Olson v. Weitz, 37 Wn.2d 70, 71, 221 P.2d 537, 538 (1950).
lao Morner v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 31 Wn.2d 282, 196 P.2d 744 (1948).
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fendant,"'' in truth its only office is to enable the plaintiff to withstand
the defendant's motion for a non-suit." 2 Since it is a rule of evidence,
as opposed to a rule of substantive law, the plaintiff is entitled to no
instruction upon it; and despite the implication that "the thing speaks
for itself," the judge may not charge the jury that in law there would
be an inference of negligence from a given state of facts.8
Yet res ipsa, offering avoidance of the requirement that the standard
of care and the breach thereof be established by expert medical testi-
mony, carries with it the threat of imposing a form of strict liability
upon the physician if improperly applied. To date, the Washington
court has resisted attempts to elevate it from a "rule of evidence" to a
"rule of sympathy," and, while there exists no fixed, general rule de-
termining its applicability in all cases,'8 4 certain criteria have been
established. To secure the physician from speculation upon "medical
questions" without the knowledge or experience of the jury or the
court, before the plaintiff may resort to res ipsa, a "layman must be
able to say... that the bad result could not have occurred but for the
negligence of the defendant.' 8 8  And, in this respect, the defendant
must have had the sole and exclusive control of the agency or instru-
mentality which actually caused the injury."8 In effect, these factors
are but an extension of the rule that a causal connection be established
between the defendant's conduct and the resultant injury, and that the
jury cannot choose between two conflicting theories.
While the plaintiff is allowed to plead and prove specific acts of
negligence,'87 he loses the right to rely on res ipsa where the "evidence
goes so far as to fully explain the cause or causes of the action which
injured him."'88 In this respect, the plaintiff is not bound by the
defendant's evidence and may rely on res ipsa even though the de-
181 Richison v. Nunn, 57 Wn2d 1, 5, 340 P.2d 793, 795 (1959).
182 Chase v. Beard, 55 Wn.2d 58, 346 P.2d 315 (1959). In Malpractice-The Lay-
man' Common Medical Knowledge and Experience and Res Ipsa Loquitur, supra note
165, it is pointed out that res ipsa is "not meant to be a substitute for affirmative evi-
dence. Rather, it is intended to aid the plaintiff in submitting his evidence, and to
eliminate the necessity of positive evidence where valid inference of fact lies."
183 Ball v. Mudge, 64 Wn.2d 263, 391 P.2d 201 (1964), and Chase v. Beard,
supra note 182.
18 4 Morner v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., supra note 180.
18z Nelson v. Murphy, 42 Wn.2d 737, 740, 258 P.2d 472, 474 (1953).
181 Morner v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., supra note 180. It is also a requirement that
there be no contributory negligence upon the part of the plaintiff. Alonzo v. Rogers,
155 Wash. 206, 283 Pac. 709 (1930).
187 Kemalyan v. Henderson, 45 Wn2d 693, 277 P.2d 372 (1954).
18 8 Id. at 706, 277 P.2d at 379.
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fendant's testimony, if believed, would fully explain how the injury
occurred.' s
The application of res ipsa loquitur, insofar as it rests upon an injury
of the kind which does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negli-
gence, 90 is closely allied with those cases where negligence was found
as a matter of law,"91 or where the jury was deemed competent to
establish a fact from which negligence followed." 2 With respect to the
latter, a further exception to the rule requiring expert testimony has
been recognized where the defendant's want of skill or lack of care is
so gross as to be within the comprehension of laymen, and which
requires only common knowledge and experience to understand and
judge it.'
INSURING AGAINST THE RISK
As Professor Prosser notes, "insurance against liability for medical
malpractice... [has] expanded into an enormous business." 19 4 A re-
cent study conducted by the American Medical Association's Law
Department indicates that of the physicians reporting, 5.7 per cent
carried no professional liability insurance.' Although this is a reduc-
tion from the 1959 figure of 8 per cent uninsured,9 8 representing some
10,300 practitioners, 97 it is nevertheless a significant and surprising
figure for, "a doctor simply cannot afford to practice unless he is
protected by malpractice insurance.') 9 8
189 Ibid. But see, Stickney v. Congdon, 131 Wash. 7, 228 Pac. 849 (1924), which
held the rule of res ipsa loquitur inapplicable where the evidence is conflicting.
'Do PRossEm, TORTS § 42, at 200 (2nd ed. 1955). See also, 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
NEGLIGENCE § 418, at 1185 (1962).
291 McCormick v. Jones, 152 Wash. 508, 278 Pac. 181 (1929), where the court held
the introduction of a foreign substance into a wound, without its removal, constitutes
negligence as a matter of law.
See also Wynne v. Harvey, 96 Wash. 379, 165 Pac. 67 (1917), where the court held
the failure to remove a foreign substance from an incision negligence per se.
192 See Rae v. Nelson, 152 Wash. 10, 277 Pac. 75 (1929) (failure to discover and
remedy a severed artery); McGrady v. Brink, 195 Wash. 626, 81 P.2d 800 (1938)
(hemostat left in abdomen).
103 See Annot., 141 A.L.1. 5 (1942), and Comment, 8 ALA. L. Rav. 325 (1956). In
Wharton v. Warner, 75 Wash. 470, 135 Pac. 235 (1913), where a twelve inch spring
was left in the patient's body following "curettement of the uterus," the court allowed
the jury to infer negligence without the aid of medical testimony. And, in Wynne v.
Harvey, supra note 191, where a mop sponge was left in the incision, a layman patient
was deemed competent to testify as to the changing of dressings, the presence of pus,
the sterilization of drainage tubes, and other matters of similar nature which the court
labeled questions of fact making the question of negligence one for the jury.
'94 PROssER, Tours § 84, at 569 (3rd ed. 1964).
195 AMA News, Oct. 12, 1964, p. 14, col. 1.
198 Silverman, Medicine's Legal Nightmare, Saturday Evening Post, April 25, 1959,
pp. 36, 120.
197 Doctor & Law, March 1958, p. 1.
'us Belli, Ready For The Plaintiff, 30 Tza,. L.Q. 408, 426 (1957).
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Most of the professional liability policies currently written contain
an agreement by the insurer to pay, on behalf of the insured, "all sums
which the insured shall become legally obligated to pay as damages
because of injury arising out of malpractice, error or mistake in ren-
dering or failing to render professional services in the practice of the
insured's profession....""' While coverage is generally not limited
to injuries to patients or to a particular type of injury, the insurer's
obligation is limited to those injuries which may properly be said to
have arisen in the practice of the insured's profession. Protection
does not extend, unless specifically included, to partnership liability,2"
criminal acts,2 ' acts done while the physician is under the influence
of intoxicants or narcotics,2"2 or to guaranties of cures or effectiveness
of operations. 3 (See, however, Sutherland v. Fidelity & Cas. Co.,2
where a policy covering "malpractice, error or mistake" was held to
extend to a judgment for damages for breach of an express contract
to remove all of the patient's gallstones.)
Since "injury" is usually not limited to specific causes, the term
should include bodily injury, property damage, false imprisonment,
undue familiarity, invasion of privacy, mental anguish, libel and
slander." In Washington, "injury" also encompasses damages arising
from the breach of an express, and perhaps, an implied contract.
Further, since the court has defined malpractice as including instances
of assault and battery,20 ' this would be covered unless specifically
excluded.
At first glance, it seems unlikely that libel or slander could be
said to arise in the practice of the insured's profession through mal-
practice, error or mistake. Indeed, in Maier v. United States Fid. &
Guar. Co.," 7 where the policy specifically included libel arising from
19 Hirsh, Insuring Against Medical Professional Liability, 12 VAND. L. REv. 667,
668 (1959).
200 Ibid. See also CUSUMANO, MALPRACTICE LAW DIssECTED FOR QUICK GRASPING
96 (1962). However, the insurer's obligation does run to damages incurred through
the acts of others for whose conduct the insured-physician is responsible.
20, LONG, THE PHYSICIAN AND THE LAW 241 (2d ed. 1959). But see Sommer v.
New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 171 F. Supp. 84 (E.D. Miss. 1959), where the word
"malpractice" was held to include the performance of a criminal act, i.e. assault and
battery, citing Physicians' and Dentists' Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wn.2d 38, 111 P.2d 568
(1941).
202 LONG, op. cit. supra note 201, at 241.
203 11 COUCH, INSURANCE § 44:365, at 754 (2nd ed. 1963). See also McGee v.
United States Fid. & Cas. Co., 53 F.2d 953 (1st Cir. 1931).
204 103 Wash. 583, 175 Pac. 187 (1918).
205 Hirsh, supra note 199, at 670.
206 Physicians' and Dentists' Business Bureau v. Dray, 8 Wn.2d 38, 111 P.2d 568
(1941).
207 131 Colo. 571, 298 P.2d 391 (1956).
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professional services, coverage was held to extend to a libelous state-
ment written in the margin of a death certificate, but not to the later
publication of the libel in a newspaper. Where the term "injury"
alone is used and is unqualified, one would expect libel and slander
to be covered if only through the construction of ambiguity against
the insurer. The determination of ultimate responsibility, however,
will hinge upon the proximity and relationship of the libel to the per-
formance of professional services. Additional justification for this
conclusion is found in the Washington court's holding that the words
"malpractice, error or mistake" are not synonymous, and that such
a policy is not limited to cases invoking the rules peculiar to mal-
practice. °0
Other than these problems of interpretation, the insurer's obligation
is conditioned upon the policy's being in effect at the time of injury,
though it is immaterial how long the policy has been in force or when
the claimant became a patient."' The insurer's obligation is also con-
ditioned upon prompt notice of a claim and of continuing cooperation-
including settlement where that is deemed expedient. Policies are
also sometimes limited to claims asserted against the insured within
a specified period of time.2 10 The policy may usually be cancelled
at any time by the insured, and upon (ten days) written notice of
intent to cancel by the insurer.2 11
Although problems of medical professional liability are far from
problems merely of insurance, the latter has had its impact upon this
field as upon the law of torts generally.12 Much of the inconvenience
and annoyance of answering a malpractice claims has been saved the
physician by the intervention of the insurer, while the risk of monetary
loss has been spread over a broader base. Again, even this fails to
minimize the fact and fear of suit, the real or imagined injury to
reputation. And, as the number of claims increases, the premium
increases. Yet this remains a small price to pay for circumventing
20s Sutherland v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 103 Wash. 583, 175 Pac. 187 (1918).
209 11 CoucH, INSURANCE § 44:362, at 753 (2nd ed. 1963).
210 Id. § 44:363, at 753.
2llHirsh, supra note 199, at 669. See also Belli, Ready For The Plaintiff, 30
Tma. L.Q. 408 (1957).
212 The expansion of liability insurance is the foundation of the controversy which
now rages between those who contend that such insurance has revolutionized the law
of torts and that all personal injury actions should become a matter of strict liability
due to the obsolescence of the rules of negligence, and those who view this expansion
not as the cause, but as the consequence of the change in the "range and scope of the
danger to be guarded against." See Paossm?, ToRTs § 84, at 569 (3rd ed. 1964).
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what has become an "occupational hazard"--a price which may well
be recouped in the fee charged.
CONCLUSION
Just as the physician, through the obligations of his profession, owes
a duty to society, so society is obliged to protect the physician from
unwarranted, restrictive legal harrassment. Despite the advance in
malpractice claims, it is suggested that the physician now occupies a
protected and favorable position at law. Not only has the plaintiff the
burden of proving that the physician's conduct was the cause of the
trauma, to the exclusion of other causes, he must also establish that
the physician departed from the standard of care and skill exercised
by other members of the medical profession in the same, or similar,
locality, at that time. A mere departure from that standard is not
alone negligence, since the physician need follow only a course of
treatment which has the sanction of a "respectable minority" of the
medical profession. All of this the plaintiff must prove by persuading
one of the defendant's (reluctant) colleagues to testify on his behalf,
and by persuading the court that this expert is familiar with the stand-
ards of practice in the locality, in the defendant's field of practice, and
in the defendant's "school." To summarize these rules is not to mini-
mize the considerations from which they have issued, nor does it
minimize the fact that-allied with the conservative application of res
ipsa by the Washington court-a difficult barrier to recovery has been
erected. But this testimony does negate sympathy for such "inspired"
legislation as the Good Samaritan laws, which function under circum-
stances and in situations where even more stringent restrictions upon
liability are imposed.
Undoubtedly, the increase in medical professional liability claims
is viewed with distaste and skepticism by members of the medical
profession; even this restatement of the protection afforded by law
is perhaps little comfort. However, it is no more accurate to dismiss
this increase as an "occupational hazard" than to characterize it as a
manifestation of a hostile society bred in a predatory "Robin Hood"
atmosphere. The mere increase in malpractice claims justifies neither
reaction. Consider the following.
In 1915, the Nebraska court213 held as a matter of law that a sur-
geon's failure to utilize X-ray photographs in treating a bone fracture
213 Van Boskirk v. Pinto, 99 Neb. 164, 155 N.W. 889 (1915).
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was not negligence, or evidence from which the jury could infer
negligence. In 1947, a California court214 took judicial notice that
good surgical practice always requires the taking of X-rays, and the
court held that a finding of negligence was supported by a failure in
this respect. Certainly none would indict this finding; it but reflects
the advances made in medicine and surgery, the reasonable demands
now made of the medical profession. True, liability has been expanded,
but this is neither predatory nor alarming. This is but one of many
instances which should be considered before responding emotionally
to the statistics respecting "medicine's legal nightmare." To cry wolf
here is as hollow as such an outburst in the Good Samaritan context.
Both involve the risk that the legitimate plea will go ignored.
Although it is true that both the increase in questions of medical
professional liability, and the increasing importance of medicine in the
disposition of personal injury actions have united the two professions
in a sometimes uncomfortable alliance, it is believed that the increasing
development of, and interest in, forensic medicine will assume a major
role in attaining a common and compatible ground, from which the
mutual pledge to the betterment and protection of the individual may
be advanced.
214 Agnew v. Los Angeles, 82 Cal. App. 2d 616, 186 P.2d 450 (1947).
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